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1 Introduction 
 
During the past ten years of democracy in South Africa, administrative law,1 and 
administrative justice,2 has become increasingly important in the realm of 
environmental law.3
                                                          
∗  Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, North-West University, Potchefstroom Campus. My thanks to 
Willemien du Plessis and Anel du Plessis, Faculty of Law, North-West University, Potchefstroom 
Campus, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The views expressed herein 
and any errors are my own.  
1  Various definitions of administrative law exist. See for instance Devenish, Govender and Hulme 
Administrative Law 7-8. Administrative law is however increasingly regarded as also applying to 
public authorities in a broad and strict sense. For the purpose of this article, administrative law is 
defined as that branch of public law: "…regulating the activities of bodies that exercise public 
powers or perform public functions, irrespective of whether those bodies are public authorities in a 
strict sense". See in this regard Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 2. 
Administrative law emphasises one particular branch of the state system, namely that of public 
administration, and more particularly administrative activities by the state. In this context, 
administrative law describes what the administration must do and what it may do. It also provides 
for remedies in the case of maladministration. The actions of some private institutions, or bodies, 
may also qualify as administrative actions, even though these bodies and institutions are not 
strictly speaking part of the broader public administration domain. See in this regard Hoexter and 
Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 2-4; Glazewski Environmental Law 99; and 
Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 83-85. 
2  S 33 of the 1996 Constitution is known as the 'just administrative action' clause. Administrative 
justice is defined for the purpose of this article as: "…that part of public law which regulates the 
exercise of administrative action, that is the exercise of public powers and the performance of 
public functions by organs of state, which falls within the constitutional right to just administrative 
action laid down in s 33 of the Constitution." Burns Administrative Law 9.  
The definition of just administrative action, or administrative justice, oddly correlates with the 
definition of administrative law explained in n 1 above. The only logical explanation for this, is 
perhaps because administrative justice and administrative law are equated in terms of their scope, 
nature, aims and application possibilities. Be this as it may, one can at the very least argue that 
administrative law is necessary to realise administrative justice in SA. Devenish, Govender and 
Hulme Administrative Law 11, 14-17. 
  It is correctly observed in this regard that the effectiveness of 
environmental law not so much relates to the content thereof, but rather to lack of 
3  Glazewski Environmental Law 97-99. Environmental law is defined for the purpose of this article 
as: "The amalgamation of norms, standards, legislation, administrative regulation, and 
international law that aims to regulate human activities and natural resources in a sustainable 
fashion, by way of environmental management and environmental governance" (adapted from 
Glazewski Environmental Law 11). It is noteworthy that the definition of environmental law 
specifically includes administrative regulation, hence supporting the argument in par 2 and 3 
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adequate enforcement of, what is generally regarded, as a modern and progressive 
environmental law regime.4
Enforcement of environmental law arguably relates to administrative actions and 
administrative decision-making processes and procedures carried out by relevant 
environmental authorities, within the more general realm of environmental 
administration and environmental governance.
   
5 One of the aspects that are regulated 
by environmental governance and administration, is infrastructural development, 
which in most instances, may have a detrimental effect on the environment. 
Infrastructural development activities are important for, inter alia, economic progress 
and the improvement of socio-economic conditions, and depend to a large extent on 
administrative decision-making by environmental authorities.6 It is however 
noteworthy that development is sometimes hampered by inefficient and delayed 
decision-making processes by environmental authorities, which may adversely affect 
the developer.7
It is argued in this article that there exists a close relationship between administrative 
implementation and decision-making, and a right to an environment that is not 
harmful to peoples' health or well-being.
 For a balance to be created between the rights of the developer and the 
duties on environmental authorities to realise the content and objectives of 
constitutional and environmental legislation, it is accordingly necessary to investigate 
the issue of administrative justice in the context of environmental administration and 
governance.  
8
                                                                                                                                                                      
below that administrative implementation and decision-making are paramount for the efficient 
implementation of environmental law in SA. 
4  De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 402. 
5  Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 2. 
6  Kotzé and Van der Walt 2003 SAJELP 42, 63-66. 
7  Kotzé and Van der Walt 2003 SAJELP 42. 
8  S 24 of the 1996 Constitution. See par 2 below for a further discussion.  
  By investigating some of the constitutional 
rights of the developer, as well as the concept of administrative justice, this article 
further argues that environmental governance and administration, which should 
ideally be based on administrative justice, may be beneficial to individuals who carry 
out activities that may adversely impact on the environment. The provisions of the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter the PAJA) are also 
reflected on, in order to indicate the relevance of some provisions of this act for an 
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aggrieved developer whose right to administrative justice has been infringed. The 
importance and relevance of administrative justice in the context of environmental 
governance are illustrated by reflecting on two recent judgments that, although not 
specifically dealing with administrative justice in the context of environmental 
administration, may provide some guidance as to the future application of 
administrative justice in the realm of environmental governance and administration. In 
discussing these judgments, specific emphasis is placed on the right to administrative 
justice, and the possible effect of the judicial interpretation of administrative justice 
on other rights of the developer that correlate with the section 33 constitutional right.9
Section 24 reflects characteristics of both a classical fundamental human right and a 
socio-economic right.
 
 
2 Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution and administrative implementation 
Section 24 of the 1996 Constitution states that: 
Everyone has the right- 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that- 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural 
resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development. 
10 The first generational character of the right is embodied in 
section 24(a), whilst the socio-economic character of the right is found in section 
24(b).11
                                                          
9  These rights include the right to dispute settlement, the right to access to information, and the right 
to a wide legal standing. See par 4 below for a detailed discussion.  
10  De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 403-405. 
11  Glazewski Environment 413. 
 Section 24(b) strongly articulates the vertical operation of the environmental 
right, which supports the contention that the application of the right also relates to 
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administrative implementation of this right by way of reasonable legislative and other 
measures.12
The realisation of section 24 may be regarded as a regulatory function belonging to 
government.
   
13 Government in this context includes, inter alia: national, provincial 
and local spheres;14 the various line functionaries in each sphere;15 and government 
officials functioning in these spheres and line functions. It may furthermore be 
deduced that there is a relationship between the enforcement of the environmental 
right and administrative implementation. Implementation in this context is a very 
broad term which arguably includes the enforcement of legislation, making of 
subsidiary rules, and formulation of policy.16 Various actors are involved with the 
implementation of environmental law. These include public authorities, employees of 
public authorities and government departments, and the public service or 
administration.17
… the public service is under a constitutional duty loyally to execute 'the 
lawful policies of the government of the day', and it does this chiefly by 
implementing legislation.
 More pertinent in this regard however is that: 
18
The enforcement of provisions pertaining to environmental authorisations, such as 
water use licences provided for in chapter 4 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 
(hereafter the NWA), serves as an example of an instance where administrative 
implementation through environmental administration, is executed by relevant 
departments of government, in this case the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
(hereafter DWAF).
   
19
                                                          
12  S 8 of the 1996 Constitution states that a "…provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a 
juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right 
and the nature of any duty imposed by the right". Hence, it is argued in addition, that s 24 also has 
a horisontal operation which makes it applicable between individuals themselves and not only 
between the state and individuals. See also Glazewski Environmental Law 88-89. 
13  For a detailed discussion on the administration, implementation and enforcement of environmental 
law in SA, see Glazewski Environmental Law 127-157. 
14 S 40(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
15  Governmental line functionaries in environmental context may include, inter alia, the Department 
of Environmental Affairs and Tourism; the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry; the 
Department of Minerals and Energy; and the South African Heritage Resources Agency. 
16  Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 7. 
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid. 
19  See also the example discussed in par 3 below. 
 Water is a natural resources as contemplated in section 24(b)(iii) 
of the 1996 Constitution. Hence, there is an obligation on government to 'secure 
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ecologically sustainable development' of this natural resource through, inter alia, the 
implementation of water use licence conditions which set limits within which water 
can be used. Such implementation, or in other words, the issuing of water use 
licences, may be done by way of, inter alia, environmental administration and 
governance. It is argued further that implementation may be done by way of 
'reasonable legislative and other measures' contemplated in section 24(b) of the 1996 
Constitution. In this instance, 'reasonable legislative and other measures' may include 
the provisions of the NWA. 
The relationship between section 24 and administrative implementation is furthermore 
evident from the argument that the most obvious feature of potential environmental 
impacts and pollution problems is that they affect both public health and resources, 
which are public goods.20  The risk of pollution often arises from otherwise legitimate 
activities within society, such as the accommodation of waste in the environment in a 
manner which may impact on health and/or the integrity of resources. The implication 
is that the control of potential impacts on humans and the environment is typically a 
regulatory function, since society must be protected from pollution by government 
action.21
It is furthermore argued that there exists a close link between environmental 
governance and environmental administration and implementation. Environmental 
governance is a relatively novel term in South African law. It can be defined as "…the 
  Administrative implementation is therefore necessary to comprehensively 
and adequately give effect to, and realise the aims of, section 24 through the execution 
of necessary government actions.  
                                                          
20  Bosman Waste Disposal 28. 
21  Ibid. The argument that the control of potential impacts on humans and the environment is 
typically a regulatory function, is strengthened by the notion of the social welfare state, in which 
the state plays a "…positive and interventionist role in socio-economic regeneration and the 
welfare of citizens". Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 15. Although SA 
can not be regarded as a typical social welfare state, the state has in the past, and continues to play, 
an active interventionist role. Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 15. As 
pollution and environmental degradation continue to intensify, one might reasonably expect that 
environmental regulation through intervention may become all the more significant in SA. This 
may have a direct bearing on the relevance of administrative justice in SA, because as 
environmental administration and regulation increase, so may administrative justice become 
increasingly important. See also Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 27. Burns 
specifically emphasises the interventionist role of the welfare state in environmental context by 
stating that "…the state takes active steps to improve the state economy by stimulating 
development, protecting and beautifying the environment and assisting people to enrich their 
lives". Burns Administrative Law 7. 
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collection of legislative, executive and administrative functions, processes and 
instruments used by any organ of state to ensure sustainable behaviour by all as far as 
governance activities, products, services, processes and tools are concerned."22 Hence 
it may be said that government can realise the objectives of section 24, inter alia, by 
way of administrative implementation, or environmental governance. Administrative 
implementation and enforcement of environmental law may be done by way of 
judicial measures and administrative measures.23 The focus of this article is on 
administrative measures which are applied by the executive branch of government.24 
These measures include, inter alia, subordinate legislation, regulations, statutory 
directives, authorisation requirements and abatement notices.25  The mandate for this 
administrative implementation, or governance, will in this case be reasonable 
legislative and other measures, which provide the impetus for action on behalf of 
government. Whilst governance refers to the broader activities or functions of the 
state, environmental administration, or implementation, entails the specific execution 
of governance functions in terms of section 24 of the 1996 Constitution and 
environmental sectoral legislation. The provisions of section 24 of the 1996 
Constitution thus set the framework for the administration of environmental law, by 
providing the impetus for implementation and governance through administrative 
functions within the broader context of environmental legislation.26
                                                          
22  Nel and Du Plessis "Integrated Environmental Management" 89. 
23  Judicial measures include criminal sanctions, civil sanctions, judicial review and interdicts which 
are normally applied by the judiciary. Glazewski Environmental Law 143. 
24  This article specifically focuses on administrative measures, or acts, employed by environmental 
authorities. Apart from judicial review which may be regarded as a remedy in the case of 
maladministration, judicial measures are accordingly not discussed. Administrative acts include 
"…those acts by which the administration creates, alters or terminates individual administrative 
law relationships [by way of finding the] most expedient and desirable solution in the public 
interest". Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 103. 
25  Glazewski Environmental Law 143. 
26  It is even observed in this regard that the 1996 Constitution, which includes the environmental 
right, constitutes one of the sources of administrative law. Original and delegated legislation, such 
as, inter alia, the National Water Act 36 of 1998, the National Environmental Management Act 
107 of 1998, the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989, as well as various provincial 
environmental acts and environmental by-laws, also serve as sources of administrative law. See 
further Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 16-18. The mere fact that 
environmental legislative and constitutional provisions act as primary sources of administrative 
law, justifies the contention that there is indeed a close correlation and relationship between 
administrative law, administrative justice and the environment. It should also be noted that 
administrative practice may serve as a source of administrative law. Public officials may therefore 
in certain instances rely on established practice within the administration to justify a certain 
administrative action. This is however more the exception than the rule, and it is envisaged that 
where the right to administrative justice has been infringed by, for example an unreasonable delay 
in the environmental authorization process, courts will arguably not attach great significance to 
this source. See Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 35-49, 58-59. 
 The relationship 
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between environmental governance, environmental administration, environmental 
implementation and administrative justice, is discussed in further detail hereafter.27
Glazewski
 
 
3 The developer, the environment and administration 
28 observes that "…environmental law can be described as administrative 
law in action".29
… is because administrative law is essentially concerned with administrative 
decision-making and environmental conflicts invariably turn on the exercise 
of administrative decision-making powers.
 He substantiates this contention by adding that the reason for this- 
30
In other words, the administration of environmental law lies mainly with the state 
administration which includes, inter alia, state structures, processes and officials. The 
sheer scope of administrative law, also justifies the relationship and interplay between 
environmental law and administrative law. It is observed in this regard that the scope 
of administrative law is quite broad and includes, inter alia, activities relating to the 
granting of licences, town-planning, other infrastructural development activities, and 
also the protection of the environment.
  
31
Based on the foregoing, it is envisaged that a developer would approach a relevant 
environmental authority when undertaking any development that might fall within the 
ambit of relevant provisions of environmental legislation. Some practical examples 
would include for instance: the establishment of a golf estate in an environmentally 
sensitive coastal area, flooding of valleys for the building of dams to ensure 
freshwater supply, establishment of mining structures, and building of low-cost 
 
                                                          
27  See par 3 below.  
28  Glazewski Environmental Law 97. 
29  It is interesting to note that administrative law has been described as 'the state in motion'. Emphasis 
is accordingly placed on the functional element rather than the structural element of government. 
See in this regard Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 10. In concurring 
with Glazewski, one can thus argue that environmental law holds as an essential element, the 
functions of government insofar as it pertains to the execution of state actions, in order to realise 
the content of s 24 of the 1996 Constitution and environmental law in general. The premise of this 
argument is the equation between environmental law and administrative law that Glazewski puts 
forward. Glazewski Environmental Law 97. 
30  Glazewski Environmental Law 97. 
31  Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 14. 
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housing structures to address the plight of the homeless. The foregoing represents 
infrastructural development activities, which can only commence if the necessary 
authorisations in terms of environmental sectoral legislation are obtained from the 
relevant environmental authority.32
A typical example of an environmental authorisation is a record of decision in terms 
of an environmental impact assessment which must be obtained under sections 21, 22, 
23 and 26 of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 (hereafter the ECA) before 
an activity identified under R 1182, R 1183 and R 1184, published in Government 
Gazette 18261 of 5 September 1997 is undertaken.
 These authorities may include amongst others, the 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (hereafter DEAT), the DWAF, the 
Department of Minerals and Energy, and various provincial and local departments 
entrusted with environmental governance functions.  
33 Section 21 states that the 
minister of the DEAT may identify those activities that may have a detrimental effect 
on the environment. These activities include, but are not limited to, activities relating 
to land use and land transformation; water use and water disposal; resource removal, 
including natural living resources; resource renewal; agricultural processes; industrial 
processes; transportation; energy generation and energy distribution; waste and 
sewage disposal; chemical treatment; and recreation.34 Before such an activity is to be 
undertaken, the developer must conduct an environmental impact assessment and only 
after consideration by the relevant authority, will an authorisation in the form of a 
record of decision be issued or not.35
                                                          
32  This sectoral legislation includes, inter alia, the National Water Act 36 of 1998, the Water Services 
Act 108 of 1997, the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998, the National Forests Act 84 of 
1998, the National Heritage Resources Act 25 of 1999, the National Nuclear Energy Regulator Act 
47 of 1999, the National Veld and Forest Fire Act 101 of 1998, the Nuclear Energy Act 46 of 
1999, and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002. Cf Glazewski 
Environmental Law 152-154 for a further discussion on permits, licensing, scheduling, abatement 
notices, and directives.  
33  The provisions of the ECA relating to environmental impact assessment should be read together 
with R 1182, R 1183 and R 1184, published in GG 18261 of 5 September 1997. It is envisaged that 
the environmental impact assessment procedure will in future resort under the provisions of the 
NEMA. The draft environmental impact assessment regulations were distributed for comment at 
the time of writing. These regulations are not yet in force, and will therefore not be discussed for 
the purpose of this article. For a detailed discussion of administrative justice in terms of the current 
environmental impact assessment process, see Kotzé and Van der Walt 2003 SAJELP 39-66. 
34  S 21(2)(a)-21(2)(k) of the ECA. 
35  S 22(1) states that: "No person shall undertake an activity identified in terms of s 21(1) or cause 
such an activity to be undertaken except by virtue of a written authorisation issued by the Minister 
or by a competent authority or local authority or an officer…" 
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It is clear in this instance that a developer who seeks to undertake any of the above 
activities, will be subject to administrative decision-making procedures. The status of 
the developer may invariably be affected during the processing of the development 
application, because in order to exercise its governing function, the state bears and 
enforces state authority when having to approve of a development activity. The 
individual may consequently be placed in an inferior position vis-à-vis the state.36 In 
this context, the developer arguably would want to have his or her application 
processed as soon as possible due to, for example, financial considerations.37
4.1 The right to just administrative action 
 Any 
delays during the administrative decision-making process may, however, affect his or 
her financial position by infringing his or her right to administrative action that is 
lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. The question accordingly arises, whether the 
developer has certain rights on the basis of which he or she can be protected from 
unlawful, unreasonable, and procedurally unfair administrative action. 
 
4 The constitutional rights of an aggrieved developer 
Based on the foregoing, it is argued that the developer has certain rights when it 
comes to administrative decision-making by the relevant environmental authority.38
                                                          
36  Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 85. 
37  It is generally accepted that time and financial constraints, resulting from compliance with 
authorisation requirements, place a burden on developers, and may even have a negative effect on 
the vision for sustainable development enumerated in s 24 of the 1996 Constitution. The purpose 
of authorisations is arguably not to strain development by unduly withholding development 
approval, but rather to guide development on a road towards sustainability. The foregoing 
describes a fine balance between the rights of the developer and the duties of the relevant 
environmental authority to give effect to environmental legislation and constitutional provisions. 
For this balance to be created, it is argued that administrative decision-making must be based on 
the principle of administrative justice. See for a detailed discussion Kotzé and Van der Walt 2003 
SAJELP 39-66. 
38  It is argued that the constitutionalisation of administrative law gave rise to the emergence of a 
rights-based approach to administrative law in general and administrative justice in particular. This 
new approach therefore supports the argument that a developer may have certain rights in terms of 
administrative implementation in environmental context. Devenish, Govender and Hulme 
Administrative Law 6 and Burns Administrative Law 53-75. 
 
With reference to the hypothetical scenario in paragraph 3 above, it must be clarified 
first and foremost that the developer does not necessarily have a right to commence an 
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infrastructural development for the sake of financial gain.39 Rather, the developer has 
a right to, inter alia, just administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.40
Section 33 essentially embraces the concept of administrative justice. Administrative 
justice aims to, inter alia, ensure good governance and administration, ensure fair 
dealing in administrative context, enhance protection of the individual against abuse 
of state power, promote public participation in decision-making, and strengthen the 
notion that public officials are answerable and accountable to the public they are 
meant to serve.
 This right is provided for by section 33 of the 1996 Constitution 
which states that: 
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative 
action has the right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and 
must - 
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, 
where appropriate, an independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in 
subsections (1) and (2); and 
(c) promote an efficient administration. 
41 In sharp contrast with the past regime of parliamentary sovereignty, 
it is argued that individuals have certain rights, privileges and liberties in the context 
of an administrative relationship. These rights are enumerated in, inter alia, section 33 
of the 1996 Constitution. Where the public administration consequently acts in an 
unlawful manner and contrary to public interest when administering its functions, the 
state may be held liable in terms of section 33 and the provisions of the PAJA.42
There is a close relationship between administrative justice and the term 
"administrative action". The meaning of "administrative action" in section 33(1), is 
demarcated to include actions of an administrative nature which are taken by bodies 
 
                                                          
39  As far as could be ascertained, no explicit right to development exists in South African law. Kotzé 
and Van der Walt 2003 SAJELP 40. 
40  S 33 of the 1996 Constitution.  
41  Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 14-16. 
42  Ibid 85 and par 5 below. 
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that exercise public power.43 These actions include adjudicative administrative 
decisions and governmental administration through regulation.44 Administrative 
action should however also be afforded a "…wide and value-coherent interpretation 
rather than a narrow one".45 If this approach is followed, administrative action may 
also in some instances include certain private actions performed by private bodies.46 
Administrative action also covers regulations, legislation and administrative decisions 
made by the executive branch of government, and would necessarily include 
environmental legislation and regulations, such as the ECA and its accompanying 
regulations in terms of which environmental impact assessments are to be 
conducted.47
It is evident from section 33 that administrative action should be lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair.
   
48 Procedural fairness relates to the principles of natural justice 
that include, inter alia, the principles of audi alteram partem and nemo iudex suo 
causa.49 Whilst procedural fairness relates to the procedural aspect of natural justice, 
reasonableness relates to the substantive element of natural justice, by which a court is 
afforded the opportunity to investigate the justification of administrative actions.50 
Where someone's right to administrative justice has been adversely affected, that 
person furthermore has a right to be given written reasons.51 These reasons must be 
adequate, proper, relevant, and must relate to the administrative action under 
scrutiny.52
                                                          
43  See also par 5.1 below, where administrative action is discussed in greater detail.  
44  Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 126. 
45  Ibid 127. 
46  Ibid126-127. The focus of this article is however on administrative actions performed by 
environmental governmental authorities and would hence exclude those actions performed by such 
private bodies.  
47  Ibid 128. See also par 3 above. 
48  See for an insightful and in-depth discussion on lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural 
fairness, Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 125-241. 
49  See the whole of s 3 of the PAJA, and Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 129. 
50  Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 130-131. 
51  See the whole of s 5 of the PAJA, and Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 
242-254. 
52  Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 133. 
 The provisions on the right to be given written reasons are arguably meant 
to promote a more transparent, public-participatory, democratic and efficient 
administration. 
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The provisions on administrative justice should be read together with the provisions 
of section 195(1) and section 195(2) of the 1996 Constitution that establish basic 
values and principles according to which the public administration must be 
executed.53 It is stated in this regard that the public administration must be governed 
by the general democratic values and principles enshrined in the 1996 Constitution. 
Moreover, a number of specific principles are provided for, which advocate that: a 
high standard of professional ethics must be promoted and maintained; efficient 
economic and effective use of resources must be promoted; public administration 
must be development-oriented; services must be provided impartially, fairly, equitably 
and without bias; people's needs must be responded to, and the public must be 
encouraged to participate in policy-making; public administration must be 
accountable; transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, 
accessible and accurate information; good human-resource management and career-
development practices to maximise human potential, must be cultivated; and public 
administration must be broadly representative of the South African people, with 
employment and personnel management practices based on ability, objectivity, 
fairness, and the need to redress the imbalances of the past to achieve broad 
representation.54 It is explicitly stated that these principles apply to all organs of state 
as well as state administration in every sphere of government.55
It is clear from the above that an individual, who seeks for example authorisation for a 
development activity that may adversely affect the environment, has certain rights 
based merely on the provisions of section 33. Broadly speaking, these rights fall 
within the ambit of the more generally-termed right to administrative justice which 
should be read together with section 195 of the 1996 Constitution. As separate 
components of this general right, the developer in particular has the right to written 
reasons, and administrative action that should be based on the principles of natural 
justice which include reasonableness and fairness. Because of these rights, it is thus 
clear that the developer does not stand wholly at the mercy of the public 
administration. The public administration may indeed be held liable and accountable 
 
                                                          
53  Kotzé and Van der Walt 2003 SAJELP 50-51. 
54  S 195(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
55  S 195(2) of the 1996 Constitution. 
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for an infringement of any of these rights, and may in addition be obliged to rectify 
any infringement. 
4.2 The right to dispute settlement 
The right to just administrative action is reinforced and extended by the right to have 
disputes settled by a court or another independent forum.56
It is trite that this right cannot be invoked where a developer applies for an 
environmental authorisation in terms of environmental legislation. For the protection 
of section 34 to become operative and applicable, it is necessary that a dispute should 
exist. A developer who is accordingly of the opinion that his or her authorisation 
application is being unreasonably delayed or denied unlawfully, can approach a court 
of law or independent tribunal or forum, to have the legal dispute that arose because 
of the delay or denial, adjudicated.
 Section 34 of the 1996 
Constitution states that: 
Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the 
application of law decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where 
appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum. 
57 The right to have a dispute settled has even 
greater application possibilities, which may extend the rights of any aggrieved 
developer. This is because this right further includes: a right of access to a court or 
independent forum; the requirement that courts and forums should be independent and 
impartial; and the requirement that the dispute be decided in a fair and public 
hearing.58
4.3 The right of access to information 
 
The right of access to information which is currently regulated by the Promotion of 
Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (hereafter the PATIA),59
                                                          
56  S 34 of the 1996 Constitution. 
57  De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 555. 
58  See De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 554-580, for an in-depth discussion.  
59  Apart from the discussion in par 5 below, the PATIA is not discussed in detail for the purpose of 
this article. For a detailed discussion of the PATIA, see De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 
Handbook 527-553, Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 196-209, Glazewski 
Environmental Law 108-122, and Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 55-
60. 
 is enumerated in section 
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32 of the 1996 Constitution.60 Information may include any information held by the 
state that may have an impact on an aggrieved person invoking this right.61 Hence, 
information in this context may specifically relate to information used during, or for 
the sake of, decision-making, including policies and criteria used by administrative 
bodies.62 In this sense, section 32 displays interrelatedness with the provisions on 
administrative justice in section 33 of the 1996 Constitution. Inaccessible information 
held by, for example the DEAT, which was used during the assessment of an 
environmental authorisation, may be demanded by an affected developer who feels 
that his or her right to administrative justice has been infringed, due to unreasonable 
delay during the decision-making process.63 The close connection between these two 
rights was reaffirmed in Aquafund v Premier of the Western Cape64
… a person must be entitled to such information as is reasonably required by 
him to determine whether his right to lawful administrative action has been 
infringed or not. If a person is not able to establish whether his rights have 
thus been infringed, he will clearly be prejudiced.
 where it was 
stated that: 
65
Access to information held by the state may be particularly relevant in environmental 
context.
 
66
                                                          
60  The right of access to information not only includes a right of access to information held by the 
state, but also to access of information held by another person that is required for the exercise or 
protection of any rights. See s 32(b) of the 1996 Constitution. The rationale behind the right of 
access to information is arguably to foster a culture of accountable governance, since government 
can be held accountable and liable on the basis of explanations for any governmental actions. This 
right also articulates the notion of open democracy that closely correlates with the aforementioned. 
See in this regard Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 181, 187. For an insightful 
discussion of the right to access to information and some aspects of the PATIA, see O'Regan 
"Democracy and Access to Information" 11-16; Govender "Assessment of Limitation on Access to 
Information" 17-28; and Klaaren, Currie and Smith "Foreign Access to Information" 29-40. 
61  De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 526. 
62  Ibid 526. 
63  For a further discussion on the impact of the right to access to information on other rights, see 
Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 194-196.  
64  Aquafund v Premier of the Western Cape 1997 7 BCLR 907 (C).  
65  Ibid at 916E. 
66  Glazewski Environmental Law 111-112. See for a comprehensive discussion of the right to access 
to environmental information, Du Plessis SALJ 222-244; Du Plessis 1998 SAJELP 116-139; Du 
Plessis 1999 JCRDL 352-372; Du Plessis 1999 Stell LR 36-55; Du Plessis 1999 Obiter 92-112; and 
Ferreira-Snyman and Du Plessis 2002 Koers 387-404. 
 This is attributed to the notion that administrative decision-making, and 
consideration of certain technical criteria, policy consideration and so forth, may have 
a direct or indirect bearing on the environment and developers who are involved with 
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infrastructural developments.67 There is no distinction made in the PATIA between 
general information and environmental information.68 The PATIA does however 
mention "public safety or environmental risk"69 in sections 36(2)(c), 42(5)(c), 
46(a)(ii), 68(2) and 70(1) thereof, which is in most cases more applicable to 
commercial information held by private bodies and third parties such as industry, and 
not necessarily organs of state.70
The NEMA however significantly extends the right to access to information provided 
in the PATIA to environmental matters. Section 2(4)(k) of the NEMA specifically 
provides that "…[d]ecisions must be taken in an open and transparent manner, and 
access to information must be provided in accordance with the law."
   
71
Although section 31(1) states that access to environmental information will be 
regulated by the PATIA, the act, in section 6 read together with schedule 1, preserves 
section 31 of the NEMA.
 Section 
31(1)(a) of the NEMA provides in addition that: 
… every person is entitled to have access to information held by the State 
and organs of state which relates to the implementation of this Act and any 
other law affecting the environment, and to the state of the environment and 
actual and future threats to the environment, including any emissions to 
water, air or soil and the production, handling, transportation, treatment, 
storage and disposal of hazardous waste and substances. 
72
It can be deduced from the above that, in addition to the right to administrative justice 
and access to courts, any aggrieved developer who suffers at the hands of an 
 
                                                          
67  See the example of water use license under ch 4 of the National Water Act 36 of 1998 discussed in 
par 2 above. See also for a more general discussion Du Plessis 1998 SAJELP 115-139. 
68  S 9 of the PATIA.  
69  "Public safety or environmental risk" is defined in s 1 as: "…harm or risk to the environment or the 
public (including individuals in their workplace) associated with- 
(a) a product or service which is available to the public; 
(b) a substance released into the environment, including, but not limited to, the workplace; 
(c) a substance intended for human or animal consumption; 
(d) a means of public transport; or 
(e) an installation or manufacturing process or substance which is used in that installation or 
process. 
70  Glazewski Environmental Law 112. 
71  It is significant that access to information is provided for in s 2 of the NEMA. This section 
describes the national environmental management principles, which are applicable throughout SA 
to the actions of all organs of state. The NEMA therefore recognises the importance of access to 
information for the successful functioning of, not only environmental management and 
governance, but also for the achievement of the objectives of the act as a whole.  
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inefficient environmental administration, may also rely on his or her right to access to 
information.73
4.4 The right to a wide legal standing 
 The application of this right in environmental context, has significantly 
been enhanced by the provisions of the NEMA. This may arguably contribute to a 
more comprehensive protection of the rights of any aggrieved developer.  
The right to a wide legal standing, provided by section 38 of the 1996 Constitution, is 
also significant for the purpose of administrative justice.74
                                                                                                                                                                      
72  Glazewski Environmental Law 118. 
73  It should be noted that although the developer currently has an extensive right to access to 
information, the relevant public authority may in certain instances refuse to divulge information. 
See in this regard s 7, 12, 33, 35-45 of the PATIA.  
74  S 38 deals with the enforcement of rights and provides that: 
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right 
in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the court may grant appropriate 
relief, including a declaration of rights. The persons who may approach a court are - 
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; 
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
See for an in-depth discussion, Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 255-
275. 
 This right arguably aims to, 
inter alia, promote the possibility to enforce all constitutional rights, including the 
section 24 environmental right. In environmental context, it is noteworthy that the 
section 38 constitutional provisions on locus standi, have been significantly extended 
by section 32 of the NEMA. Section 32(1) states that: 
Any person or group of persons may seek appropriate relief in respect of any 
breach or threatened breach of any provision of this Act, including a 
principle contained in Chapter 1, or any other statutory provision concerned 
with the protection of the environment or the use of natural resources- 
(a) in that person's or group of person's own interest; 
(b) in the interest of, or on behalf of, a person who is, for practical reasons, 
unable to institute such proceedings; 
(c) in the interest of or on behalf of a group or class of persons whose 
interests are affected; 
(d) in the public interest; and 
(e) in the interest of protecting the environment. 
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In the first instance section 32(1) considerably extends the application of the section 
38 constitutional clause to, not only include the rights contained in the Bill of Rights, 
but also to include- 
… any breach or threatened breach of any provisions of this act [the 
NEMA]…or any other statutory provision concerned with the protection of 
the environment or the use of natural resources.75
Secondly, it may even be argued that apart from liberating public interest litigation, 
section 32(1)(e) extends the locus standi provisions, by providing that individuals or a 
group may currently act not only in their own interests, but also in the interest of the 
environment.
 
76
Adhering to its constitutional obligation contained in section 33(3) of the 1996 
Constitution, the legislator enacted the PAJA which came into operation on 30 
November 2000.
  As far as 'having an interest in the relief sought' is concerned, it is 
significant that the environment is equated in terms of legal standing with individuals 
and groups. This may ultimately broaden the rights of developers and enhance 
environmental protection when the right to just administrative action is infringed. 
 
5 The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
77 The rationale of the PAJA is to place the primary right to 
administrative justice and the courts' powers of judicial review on statutory footing.78 
Currently, administrative justice is mainly derived from the provisions of the PAJA 
and not the constitutional provisions or the common law insofar as it deals with 
review of administrative action by a court, and the provision of an efficient 
administration.79
                                                          
75  S 32(1) of the NEMA. See par 4 above for some of these acts that deal with the protection of the 
environment or the use of natural resources. 
76  See in this regard Glazewski Environmental Law 121, 149-150. 
77  S 33(3) states that national legislation must be enacted in order to give effect to the rights 
contained in s 33 of the 1996 Constitution. 
78  By defining the rules and principles of administrative procedure, the PAJA aims to promote an 
efficient administration and good governance, and to establish a culture of accountability, 
openness and transparency in the public administration. See in this regard De Waal, Currie and 
Erasmus Bill of Rights Handbook 495-497 and Burns Administrative Law 10. 
79  Dlamini states that the PAJA does not represent a complete codification of the common law. The 
latter will continue to function although it has been modified by the Constitution and partly 
codified by the PAJA. See in this regard Dlamini 2000 JSAL 71. 
 When asked to determine the scope, content and application of the 
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right to administrative justice, the judiciary will however still heed constitutional and 
common law principles that give meaning to this right.80 The constitutionally 
entrenched right to just administrative action will therefore still continue to function 
alongside the provisions of the PAJA.81
The PAJA contains a number of provisions that may be relevant for an aggrieved 
developer who seeks recourse when his or her right to administrative justice has been 
infringed by an environmental authority during environmental administration and 
governance procedures.
  
82
5.1 Administrative action defined 
  Some of these provisions are discussed hereafter. 
Administrative action is not defined in the 1996 Constitution.83 There are however a 
number of judgments that endeavoured to ascertain the meaning of administrative 
action in section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution.84 Of particular relevance for the 
purpose of this article, is the judgment in President of the Republic of South Africa v 
South African Rugby Football Union,85
                                                          
80  Burns Administrative Law 10. 
81  The main aim of the PAJA is to give effect to the provisions contemplated in s 33 of the 1996 
Constitution which embodies the right to just administrative action. By defining the rules and 
principles of administrative procedure, the PAJA furthermore aims to promote an efficient 
administration and good governance and to establish a culture of accountability, openness and 
transparency in the public administration. This is in accordance with the provisions of the 1996 
Constitution. See also Burns Administrative Law 10. 
82  Amongst other things, the PAJA provides a more detailed exposition of the constitutional right to 
administrative justice, specific procedures that are applicable to the public administration, the 
grounds for judicial review, procedures for those who wish to challenge administrative action and 
procedures for the request of written reasons. Burns Administrative Law 10. It is proposed that 
these detailed provisions may greatly assists in clarifying practical procedures for the sake of 
seeking recourse by developers. This may strengthen the position of an aggrieved developer to a 
large extent.  
83  See also par 4.1 above for a discussion of administrative action within the context of 
administrative justice. 
84  These judgments include, inter alia, Premier Province of Mpumalanga of State-Aided Schools, 
Eastern Transvaal 1999 2 SA 91 (CC); Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex 
Parte President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 674 (CC); Permanent Secretary, Department of Education, 
Eastern Cape v Ed-U-College (PE) (Section 21) 2001 2 SA 1 (CC); Despatch High School v 
HEAD, Department of Education 2003 1 SA 246 (Ckh); Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) 
v Cape Metropolitan Council 1999 4 SA 1184 (C); Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
v Chairman, Public Accountants' and Auditors' Board 2001 2 SA 980 (W); Claude Neon v 
Germiston City Council 1995 3 SA 710 (W); and Carephone v Marcus 1998 10 BCLR 1326 
(LAC). 
85  President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 1 SA 1 
(CC). 
 where it was stated that the implementation of 
legislation amounts to an administrative action. When the meaning of administrative 
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action in section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution is accordingly required to be 
established, it can be derived from this judgment that where public officials in the 
public administration domain implements legislation, such as environmental 
authorisation requirements in terms of the ECA and the NWA, this will amount to 
administrative action.86
which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, 
external legal effect.
  
Administrative action is defined in the PAJA as meaning, inter alia: 
… any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by- 
(a)  an organ of state, when- 
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms 
of any legislation; or 
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising 
a public power or performing a public function in terms of an 
empowering provision, 
87
Burns
 
88 is of the opinion that this definition is inadequate and unsatisfactory, since it 
does not clearly delineate what administrative action is.89 She points out a number of 
discrepancies with regard to the definition of administrative action in relation to 
further provisions of the PAJA. These include: that the definition mentions rights and 
not legitimate expectations, although legitimate expectations is provided for in section 
3 of the PAJA; and that the definition refers to rights that are adversely affected, while 
section 3 provides for rights or legitimate expectations that are materially and 
adversely affected.90 It is additionally argued that the definition severely limits the 
constitutional right to just administrative action,91
                                                          
86  See par 3 above. 
87  S 1 of the PAJA. 
88  Burns Administrative Law 20. 
89  Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 91-113. 
90  A positive attribute of this definition is that it indicates what is not included within the ambit of 
administrative action by providing for a number of exclusions which mainly deal with the 
executive authority of national, provincial and local authorities. Burns Administrative Law 20. 
91  Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 100, 
 which, when considered in the 
context of the bold aims of the PAJA, is an unfortunate state of affairs. 
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Administrative decision-making is central to administrative justice and hence, 
administrative action. The definition of "decision" in the PAJA accordingly stands in 
close relationship with administrative action as defined in the act. Decision is defined 
in section 1 as including: 
… any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be made, or 
required to be made, as the case may be, under an empowering provision, 
including a decision relating to- 
(a) making, suspending, revoking or refusing to make an order, award or 
determination; 
(b) giving, suspending, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, direction, 
approval, consent or permission; 
(c) issuing, suspending, revoking or refusing to issue a licence, authority or 
other instrument; 
(d) imposing a condition or restriction; 
(e) making a declaration, demand or requirement; 
(f) retaining, or refusing to deliver up, an article; or 
(g) doing or refusing to do any other act or thing of an administrative 
nature. 
This definition exudes the actions normally associated with administrative decision-
making, which can also be found in the process of implementing environmental 
legislation such as the NWA and the ECA. It is noteworthy that the definition 
specifically provides for giving, suspending, revoking or refusing to give a certificate, 
direction, approval, consent or permission; issuing, suspending, revoking or refusing 
to issue a licence; or imposing a condition or restriction. These decision-making 
procedures are especially apparent in environmental administration, where 
authorisations are issued, suspended or revoked; and conditions and restrictions 
imposed on developers who carry out activities that may have an adverse affect on the 
environment. This definition, read together with the definition of administrative 
action, furthermore includes any failure to take a decision by the relevant 
environmental authority.  
It is clear from the definition that the decision must be of an administrative or public 
law nature. This describes a relationship of inequality or subordination that exists 
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between the state and the individual.92 The decision must also be made in terms of an 
empowering provision such as legislation, from which governmental power is 
derived. This decision must be taken by, inter alia, an organ of state which may 
include governmental departments such as the DEAT and DWAF, as well as officials 
within these departments.93 It is also a requirement that the rights of the individual 
must have been adversely affected.94 Burns95 states in this regard that one should rely 
on the determination theory,96 as well as the deprivation theory when the rights of an 
individual that may be affected, are ascertained.97 Both these theories should apply 
when the rights of, for example an aggrieved developer, are established. This 
argument is supported by the socio-economic nature of some fundamental rights, such 
as the right to an environment that is not harmful to health and well-being.98 It is 
argued that for an individual to benefit from socio-economic rights, it is imperative 
that the determination theory should also apply in order to enforce and realise these 
rights.99 Rights should furthermore include rights derived from the common law,100 
customary law and legislation.101 The decision should in the last instance also have a 
direct external legal effect. This means that an aggrieved developer may approach a 
court where prejudice on the part of the administrator is evident or where mala fides 
are apparent during decision-making.102
                                                          
92  Burns Administrative Law 22. 
93  Ibid 23. 
94  See also for an in-depth discussion Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 
103-107. 
95  Burns Administrative Law 28-29. 
96  The determination theory describes the situation where the rights that and individual would have if 
she is for example granted a license in terms of an empowering provision, are determined. It 
therefore does not relate to existing rights, but to some future rights that may be obtained if a 
decision is made. Burns Administrative Law 27-28. 
97  The deprivation theory relates to those instances where an individual is deprived of some existing 
right or benefit because of a decision made. Burns Administrative Law 28-29. 
98  See par 2 above. 
99  Burns Administrative Law 29. 
100  An example of rights deduced from common law in environmental context, include those rights 
that are established in terms of neighbour law and the law of nuisance. The operative common law 
principle in this instance is sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which may be relied on where an 
industrial plant causes noise pollution or bad odours that affect a community situated close to an 
industrial plant. Glazewski Environmental Law 12. 
101  See s 39(3) of the 1996 Constitution which states that "[t]he Bill of Rights does not deny the 
existence of any other rights or freedoms that are recognized or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation…" 
102  Burns is of the opinion that the phrase "direct external legal effect" severely limits the scope of the 
right to administrative justice, by contending that it is questionable whether this phrase will pass 
constitutional scrutiny. Burns Administrative Law 29-31. See also Hoexter and Lyster 
Constitutional and Administrative Law 107-110. 
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It can be deduced that the definition of administrative action and decision, will 
include those decisions made and administrative actions performed within the 
empowering provisions of environmental legislation, such as the ECA and the NWA. 
The developer has certain rights which include both existing rights and rights that she 
may have if she is for example granted a water use licence under the NWA. Where the 
developer experiences mala fides or prejudice from the relevant environmental 
authority during the decision-making process, she will also be entitled to approach a 
court of law to enforce his or her right to administrative justice. 
5.2 Judicial control through review 
Hoexter and Lyster103 indicate that South African courts have always played, and will 
continue to play, a crucial role in overseeing the activities of the administration. The 
judiciary supervises the administration by way of judicial review which is provided 
for by, inter alia, section 33 of the 1996 Constitution, the PAJA,104 and special 
statutory review.105
… power to scrutinise administrative decisions and, where appropriate, to set 
them aside or correct them.
 Judicial review essentially describes the judiciary's- 
106
Judicial review in South Africa is firmly based on constitutional provisions, which 
include legality and the duty to protect constitutional rights.
 
107
… any person may institute proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the 
judicial review of an administrative action.
   
Of practical relevance for any developer will be the provisions of section 6 of the 
PAJA. Section 6(1) provides that- 
108
                                                          
103  Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 36-37. Administrative appeals may also 
provide effective measures for challenging the administration on the basis of the merit of a 
decision. Judicial review on the other hand tests the legality of the decision. Administrative 
appeals may also be specifically advantageous when compared with judicial review, since these 
procedures are cheaper and faster than litigation, and administrative authorities arguably have the 
necessary expertise to judge decisions made by administrative bodies. See further Hoexter and 
Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 37-41. 
104  S 6-8 of the PAJA. 
105  Eg the PATIA.  
106  Hoexter and Lyster Constitutional and Administrative Law 77. 
107  S 8 and 39 of the 1996 Constitution.  
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This may arguably also include any developer who's right to administrative justice has 
been adversely affected by the relevant environmental authority. The remainder of 
section 6 sets out the grounds for judicial review in a comprehensive fashion by 
providing for various instances where an aggrieved developer may approach a court 
of law for the review of administrative action.109
… the creative and innovative role of the courts in relation to inter alia [sic] 
administrative law jurisprudence should significantly enhance the cause of 
administrative justice.
 These provisions may arguably 
enhance the remedies at the disposal of any developer who feels that his or her 
development application has been, inter alia, unlawfully and unreasonably dealt with.  
It is also for these reasons, and other reasons discussed below, that judicial precedent 
may be especially important for aggrieved developers who want to assert their right 
to, inter alia, administrative justice. Based on the discussion in paragraph 6 below, it 
is argued that judicial review of administrative action, may be a useful remedy in the 
hands of developers who are being adversely affected by maladministration.  
 
6 An analysis of recent case law  
The reliance on jurisprudence for the development of administrative justice should not 
be underestimated since, 
110
Two recent judgments in the South Eastern Cape Local Division may provide some 
guidance as to the application of administrative justice in the context of administrative 
functions performed in terms of matters relating to the environment. These judgments 
do not specifically relate to administrative justice in terms of environmental 
administration and environmental governance. The judgments furthermore do not 
specifically address the right to dispute settlement, the right to access to information, 
and the right to a wide legal standing. These judgments rather focus on the right to 
administrative justice. However, as has been argued above, the rights to access to 
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
108  S 6 of the PAJA should be read together with s 7 of the act that sets out the procedure of judicial 
review. 
109  S 6(2)-6(3).  
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information, dispute settlement, and a wide legal standing, stand in close correlation 
with the right to administrative justice.111
Based on the merit of the applicability of administrative justice to environmental 
administration and governance, these judgments may go a long way to further 
enhance the concept of administrative justice from a judicial point of view.
 Hence, it is argued, that the importance the 
court places on the right to administrative justice, may be an indication that other 
constitutional rights closely connected to the section 33 right, may in future be 
regarded in an equally important light whenever these rights are invoked to protect 
against maladministration.  
112
6.1 Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another 
 The 
court's approach to maladministration and insufficiency in the public administration 
domain may be proof that administrative injustice within the ranks of environmental 
authorities, as was the case in these judgments, will not be tolerated. This may 
significantly advance the case of any aggrieved developer who's right to 
administrative justice and accompanying rights have been infringed. 
In the recent case of Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and 
Another,113
In terms of section 2(a) of the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992, the Director General: 
Welfare of the Eastern Cape Provincial Government, is empowered to make social 
grants to disabled persons who qualify for such grants under the provisions of the act. 
Certain regulations were published in 1998 to provide for the manner in which 
applications for grants were to be made, the approval or refusal of any application, as 
well as the date of accrual of any approved grant.
 the applicant instituted legal proceedings against the MEC for Welfare in 
the Eastern Cape, by contending, inter alia, that her right to just administrative action 
was infringed in terms of section 33 of the 1996 Constitution.  
6.1.1 Facts of the case 
114
                                                                                                                                                                      
110  Devenish, Govender and Hulme Administrative Law 15. 
111  See par 4 above. 
112  See par 2 and 3 above. 
113  Mahambehlala v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 1 SA 342 (SECLD). 
114  GN R418 GG of 31 March 1998. 
 The applicant properly applied 
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for a social grant on 7 March 2000 in terms of the regulations. A period of nine 
months lapsed during which time no response from the Department of Welfare was 
received. The applicant therefore instituted proceedings to compel the second 
respondent to, inter alia, consider the application, commence payment of the grant on 
the basis that it had been approved on 7 June 2000, pay interest on the amount in 
arrears, as well as an order to oblige the first respondent to continue payment on a 
monthly basis, and an order directing the second respondent to furnish reasons in the 
event that the application was refused. Following an order by consent, the Regional 
Director of the Department of Welfare in Port Elizabeth stated that the applicant's 
application for a disability grant had been approved on 9 November 2000. The only 
issues left to be decided were the declaratory order determining the actual date of 
accrual of the grant, as well as the contention by the applicant that her fundamental 
right to just administrative action in terms of section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution 
had been infringed.115
6.1.2 Argument of the court 
 
The applicant contended that, by delaying the approval of her application for a social 
grant, the respondent infringed her fundamental right enshrined in section 33(1) of the 
1996 Constitution that espouses the right to administrative action that is lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair.116
…common sense tells one that in a case such as this where no unduly 
intricate investigations have to be made, a period of three months would 
normally be more than sufficient to take an administrative decision. In any 
event, if it was not, one would certainly have expected the respondent to 
detail why such a period would not be reasonable.
 The argument in this regard is founded upon the 
contention that a period of three months would have been a "more than reasonable 
time" for the second respondent to have applied his mind to the matter and reached a 
decision. 
In its assessment of the matter before it, the court stated that: 
117
                                                          
115  For the purpose of this article, only the issue relating to just administrative action is discussed. 
116  At 351F. 
117  At 351I. 
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It also added that when the applicant instituted proceedings against the respondent, it 
took virtually no time at all for her application to be processed.118
… administrative sloth and inefficiency which currently bedevils the 
Department of Welfare of the Eastern Cape.
 This led the court to 
believe that it was the institution of the proceedings that led to the expeditious 
processing of her application and not the- 
119
… is today but a single department in the Eastern Cape responsible for the 
administration of the applicant's application.
 
With this statement the court rejected contentions by the respondent that lack of 
resources and infrastructure led to the unreasonable delay, and further reaffirmed that 
in the absence of adequate reasons given by the respondent to justify the delay, no 
conclusion could be reached that the delay was indeed reasonable.  
The respondents also contended that the amalgamation of a number of different social 
security systems from the previous administration led to the delay in the application 
being processed. The court however held that the respondents failed to explain how 
the amalgamation resulted in the delay and furthermore stated that there- 
120
The court added that because the respondents could not explain the delay of nine 
months, it cannot be expected from the applicant to know what led to the delay. The 
court accordingly found that if the applicant's application of 7 March 2000 had been 
reasonably dealt with, it would have been approved by no later than 7 June 2000 
which is five months before it was finally approved on 9 November 2000.
 
121
Having found that the delay in approving the grant was indeed unreasonable, the court 
proceeded to decide whether the right of the applicant to just administrative action has 
been infringed. In this respect the court relied on a dictum of Van Zyl j in Vulindlela 
Furniture Manufacturers v MEC, Department of Education and Culture, Eastern 
 
                                                          
118  At 352B. 
119  At 352B. 
120  At 352D. 
121  At 352G. 
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Cape.122
…the essence of the applicant's case in the present matter is that the 
respondents have failed to comply with their statutory duty, and not that they 
have failed to follow or adopt procedures which are ''right and just and fair''. 
The only other section which may find application in the present matter is s 
24(a). This section entitles every person to lawful administrative action 
where any of his or her rights or interests are affected or threatened. 
''Administrative action'' should in my view not be limited to administrative 
acts or decisions but should also include the failure by a body exercising 
public power to act where it has a duty to act. ''Lawful administrative action'' 
is wide enough to also include an omission to take administrative action 
where such a duty is imposed.
  By commenting on section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 200 of 1993 (hereafter the Interim Constitution) that also enumerates the right 
to just administrative action, Van Zyl j stated that:  
123
The present court concurred with the above view and stated that failure to take 
administrative action where there is a duty to take such action, would not constitute 
lawful administrative action, and would consequently infringe on the right contained 
in section 24 of the Interim Constitution.
 
124  The court consequently found that 
section 24 of the Interim Constitution and section 33(1) of the 1996 Constitution 
contain similar terms. Seen in this context, the court construed that a failure to take 
administrative action where such a duty exists, constitutes an equal infringement of 
the right to just administrative action as in those instances where an application is 
unreasonably refused.125 With reference to the failure to take the decision within a 
reasonable time, the court came to the conclusion that the applicant's right to just 
administrative action had been unlawfully and unreasonably infringed.126
The court in the final instance proceeded to assess whether the applicant would be 
entitled to appropriate relief due to the infringement of a fundamental right, as set out 
in section 38 of the 1996 Constitution.
 
127
                                                          
122  Vulindlela Furniture Manufacturers v MEC, Department of Education and Culture, Eastern Cape 
1998 4 SA 908 (Tk) at 930F–H. 
123  At 352I-353A. 
124  At 353B. 
125  At 353C. 
126  At 353D. 
127  S 38 of the 1996 Constitution provides that: "Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach 
a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and 
the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights." See also par 4.2 above.  
  In a lengthy argument, the court reiterated 
the fact that the current constitutional provisions effectively subsumed the common-
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law principles pertaining to judicial review.128 On the basis of available common-law 
remedies, the court was in the position to substitute the decision of the second 
respondent for its own, although the latter option would have been made with some 
reluctance. However, since the second respondent had no legal mandate to approve a 
grant retrospectively, the court argued that it does not have the powers to order the 
payment of the grant with retrospective effect.129 The result of this interpretation 
essentially meant that "…the applicant's common-law remedies are insufficient to be 
regarded as appropriate relief as envisaged by s 38 of the Constitution…",130 and that 
it was the duty of the court to fashion an appropriate remedy which it describes as 
constitutional relief. By drawing support from the remarks of Froneman j in Ngxuza v 
Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape,131
…should be determined against the background of a large proportion of the 
people living in this province being poor, access to legal assistance being 
limited and the necessary financial assistance to take an unhelpful and 
unresponsive public administration to court being problematic.
 the court recognised 
the need for a remedy for administrative justice which:  
132
The court accordingly granted what it termed "constitutional relief". Constitutional 
relief in this instance means that it would be just and equitable for an aggrieved 
person in the position of the applicant to be placed in the same position in which she 
would have been, had her fundamental right to lawful and reasonable administrative 
action not been infringed.
 
133
6.2 Mbanga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another 
 Constitutional relief that places the applicant in such a 
position, would be considered "appropriate" as envisaged by the 1996 Constitution. 
The case of Mbanga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape and Another,134
                                                          
128  At 353G-354E. 
129  At 354E-H.  
130  At 355B-C. 
131  Ngxuza v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2000 12 BCLR 1332 at 
1329H-I. 
132  At 355G-H. 
133  At 357 G-H. 
134  Mbanga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 1 SA 359 (SECLD). 
 ran 
simultaneously with the Mahambehlala case. The facts of both cases are very similar. 
The case of Mbanga involves the applicant applying for relief based on, inter alia, the 
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fact that his right to just administrative action, as envisaged in section 33 of the 1996 
Constitution, has been infringed. 
6.2.1 Facts of the case 
On 10 March 1998 the applicant properly applied for a social grant in terms of the 
Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 and the accompanying regulations.135
6.2.2 Argument of the court 
 No response 
was received from the Department of Welfare for more than two and a half years and 
the applicant instituted proceedings on 11 October 2000.  
The applicant claimed relief including: that the second respondent, or the appropriate 
official in his department, be ordered to consider and decide upon the applicant's 
application for a social grant; that in the event of the second respondent approving the 
applicant's application for a social grant, the first respondent be ordered to commence 
payment thereof with effect from 10 March 1998, within 15 days after the date of the 
order, and to continue such payments on a monthly basis thereafter for as long as the 
applicant qualifies for such payments in terms of the relevant laws; and to pay interest 
on arrears. The applicant furthermore claimed that in the event of the Director-
General refusing the applicant's approval for a social grant, the second respondent is 
ordered to provide reasons for the decision taken, and that the second respondent pays 
the costs of this application. Following agreement by the parties on some of the 
aforementioned issues, a remaining matter had to be addressed by the court, namely 
the contention by the applicant that his right to just administrative action has been 
infringed in terms of section 33 of the 1996 Constitution.  
As in the case of Mahambehlala, the court found in this instance that the period of 32 
months it took for a decision to be made by the respondent was unreasonable.136
                                                          
135  See par 6.1.1 above. 
136  At 369F.  
 A 
reasonable period for a decision on an application for a social grant to be taken would 
rather be three months. Hence, the failure to take a decision consequently amounted to 
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a gross infringement of the applicant's constitutional right to lawful and just 
administrative action.137
The court further emphasised that these two cases are not isolated incidents of 
administrative inefficiency but that they "… rather appear to be the tip of the 
iceberg".
 
138  A further speculation is made by the court on the escalating costs liability 
incurred by the Department of Welfare of the Eastern Cape, which includes 
substantial amounts of money, ultimately straining the public purse due to 
administrative inefficiency.139
…public funds are going to continue to be wasted solely because public 
officials do not do the work which they are being paid to do. This is an 
intolerable state of affairs. Public servants are, as their very name implies, 
there to serve the public: not to sit inert and mobile, doing little apart from 
drawing their salaries and pensions [own emphasis]. It is truly a disgrace 
that public servants in the employ of the Department of Welfare of this 
province are daily guilty of the widespread abuse of the human rights of 
others, rights enshrined in the Constitution which should zealously be 
protected and enforced. After all, they are charged by s 195(1)(e) of the 
Constitution to respond to people's needs.
 In a strongly-worded dictum the court declares that: 
140
As with the Mahambehlala case, the court, in casu, ordered "constitutional relief" to 
be afforded which essentially aims to place the applicant in the same position in 
which he would have been had his fundamental right to lawful and reasonable 
administrative action not been infringed.
 
141
6.3 Some comments 
 
A number of aspects came to the fore in the above judgments. In the first instance, it 
is clear that the court will assess the content of the right to just administrative action 
with reference to all the surrounding circumstances involved in the matter before it. It 
will take into account, inter alia, the urgency of the matter, historical perspectives, 
circumstances surrounding aggrieved individuals, current practice in state 
                                                          
137  At 369A.  
138  At 369G.  
139  At 269I.  
140  At 369J-370B. 
141  At 370H and par 6.1.2 above. 
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administration, the attitude of individuals involved in state administration, and the 
possible future effect of its judgment on administrative practices.  
Secondly, it is apparent that the court will not attribute much weight to contentions 
that administrative practices are inefficient due to lack of resources and infrastructure, 
or problems inherited from the pre-1994 government. It is evident that the protection 
of the fundamental rights of individuals is of far greater importance to the court. 
These fundamental rights may not only include the right to just administrative action, 
but also the right to dispute settlement, the right to access to information, and the right 
to a wide legal standing.142
Thirdly, the court emphasises the present judicial attitude towards an inefficient state 
administration.
 Based on the emphasis of the importance to uphold the 
right to administrative justice in these judgments, it is accordingly proposed that the 
judiciary may in future attribute the same credence to other fundamental rights that 
aim to protect the developer from maladministration by the state. 
143
It is proposed that these judgments may be of great assistance to affected individuals 
whose rights have been infringed in the realm of administrative actions performed by 
environmental governance bodies. Where a developer, for example, apply for an 
authorisation in terms of the provisions of the ECA or the NWA, it may be expected 
that courts will arguably find in favour of the developer where the application is 
unreasonably delayed, or where there are mala fides, or prejudice on the part of the 
environmental authority. This may in addition contribute to the remedies that a 
developer has where he or she suffers, for example, financial loss because of 
 In no unclear terms the court states that it will not tolerate 
inefficient administration by public officials in those instances where the fundamental 
rights of individuals may be infringed by the attitude and conduct, or non-conduct, of 
such officials. This may particularly contribute to the establishment of judicial 
precedents that may make it increasingly difficult for the state administration to hide 
behind excuses that are intolerable in a modern constitutional dispensation where the 
protection of fundamental human rights should be paramount.  
                                                          
142  This submission is based on the notion that there exists a close relationship and interrelatedness 
between the right to administrative justice, the right to dispute settlement, the right to access to 
information, and the right to a wide legal standing. See par 4 above. 
143  This is done with specific reference to the Department of Welfare of the Western Cape. 
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infrastructural development that can not proceed before the relevant environmental 
authorisations have been granted. If these judgments are an indication of future 
judicial developments with regard to the issue of unjust administrative action, it may 
be expected that the rights of developers will be more adequately protected when 
having to deal with environmental governance bodies. This may additionally imply 
that by executing environmental governance that is firmly based on the principles of 
just administrative action, the state will adhere to its constitutional obligation as 
enumerated in, inter alia, sections 24 and 33 of the 1996 Constitution. 
 
7 Conclusion 
While developers are currently given the mandate and legislative support to conduct 
development, there exist a number of inhibiting circumstances in the development 
decision-making process. As in any functionary of government, unjust administrative 
actions by environmental authorities often result in time and financial constraints for 
the developer. This may have a significant detrimental affect on development 
initiatives and measures undertaken by government to protect the environment. The 
fundamental right to just administrative action as well as accompanying rights and 
legislative provisions on administrative justice may however greatly influence this 
state of affairs.  
It has been argued in this article that there is a close relationship between just 
administrative action and environmental concerns. The state is primarily responsible 
for the execution of environmental governance in such a way that would realise the 
right to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations through reasonable legislative and other measures. Administrative justice 
in this sense may contribute significantly to the protection of the rights of the 
developer and the fundamental right relating to the environment.  
It is proposed that developers can, and henceforth should, rely on constitutional and 
legislative provisions and judicial precedents, that oblige administrative organs to 
conduct administrative decision-making in a reasonable and just way.  
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